The numerous examples of the use of human shields in armed conflicts display the contemporaneity of the problem discussed in this article and the need for a recipe to effectively combat the continuing commission of this war crime. In spite of the fact that an absolute prohibition on the use of human shields in international armed conflicts exists, as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I, consequences of unlawful resort to human shields remain inconsistent. Thus, the present article will determine when and under what circumstances attacks carried out against human shields are lawful, and which principles of international humanitarian law must be taken into account by the attacking party.
A. INTRODUCTION
'No matter what cause one defends, it will suffer permanent disgrace if one resorts to blind attacks on crowds of innocent people.' (Albert Camus) 1 This article will examine the issues relating to the legality of attacks against human shields in armed conflict. It will focus primarily on international armed conflict, exploring the legal framework and principles of international humanitarian law ('IHL') governing the obligations of attacking and defending parties. The focus is placed on international armed conflict ('IAC') because of the customary international law status which the norms pertaining to the use of human shields have obtained over time in that context. Nevertheless, given the growing number and impact of conflicts of a non-international character, an attempt will be made to address rules relevant to that context, providing examples to better illustrate the present findings.
Authors have often referred to the term 'human shields' as:
The intentional use of a party to a conflict of one or more human beings, usually civilians, or captured members of the adversary's forces ... placed between the adversary and themselves in a way meant to deter an attack against the forces using the human shields, for fear of killing or harming the unarmed shields. The shields are in effect hostages used for strategic purposes. However, this definition may not be entirely accurate. As will be examined in section C, not all human shields are intentionally placed as such against their will by defending parties. In some cases, protected persons voluntarily expose themselves to attacks in an attempt to deter the attacking party from carrying out an attack. This is why Schmitt's more concise definition will be preferred, which states that ' [h] The following sections will delve into several distinct but interrelated issues. To begin with, the main instruments regulating the prohibition of human shields will be examined. The relevant provisions of the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I ('AP I') will be explored, as well as the Rome Statute.
After outlining the ban on the use of human shields and the relevant principles of IHL, those rules will be applied to examples from international practice in section C to better illustrate the findings of the article. Most importantly, the section will assess the legal status of human shields, analysing the levels of protection enjoyed by the persons forming the shield under IHL. Furthermore, the section will consider whether human shields retain their civilian protection or could be considered as taking direct participation in hostilities and how this affects the attacking party's obligations. A distinction between involuntary and voluntary human shields will be made. The purpose of this section is to examine under what conditions the attacks would be lawful, focusing on the principles of distinction and proportionality, as well as on the obligation to take precautionary measures under AP I.
Finally, the article arrives at two pivotal findings. First, both voluntary and involuntary human shields generally retain their civilian status with an exception for voluntary shields in certain circumstances. Second, the principle of proportionality continues to apply despite the use of human shields. Nevertheless, a less restrictive proportionality assessment is possible when civilians are voluntarily protecting military objectives. The application of these two principles would not be precluded by an issuing of an advance warning by the attacking party.
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Hague Regulations
Under In sum, given the wide condemnation that Germany faced for its actions, which were tantamount to using human shields, it can be concluded that an implicit prohibition on the use of human shields could be traced back to the beginning of the 20 th century despite the difference in terminology. Thus, the Hague Regulations succeeded in setting a common standard according to which nationals of a belligerent party must not be coerced in any way to contribute to the military effort of the hostile party. Yet the numerous atrocities which followed during the World Wars made it clear that the principle of protection of the civilian population and hors de combat should be further regulated. This prompted the convening of the Geneva Conferences and the adoption of the four conventions of 1949. 24 The substance of Draft Article 25a (Article 28 of Geneva Convention IV) was not discussed. It was not until 1977 when AP I was adopted and an explicit provision pertaining to human shields was introduced.
The Geneva
Additional Protocol I of 1977
Prior to the adoption of AP I, the ban on the use of human shields was enshrined in the Third In its Commentary, the ICRC stated that fears expressed by the French delegation could not be justified. 36 The approach of the ICRC seems more reasonable since the right to self-defence should not include the use of measures that would be contrary to IHL. Indeed, the French delegation's proposal gained little support during the Conference. The dismissal of the French proposal also indicates the international community's concern as to the importance of this provision and hence the vast majority of states ruled out the possibility that it might be left out of the final text. But even more importantly, the right to self-defence was clearly perceived as not encompassing the use of civilians and civilian objects for shielding military targets.
Finally, it can be concluded that the importance of the regulations regarding the protection of the civilian population had grown immensely by the time the Protocol was adopted. This is manifested by the fact that in the draft the ICRC stated that Article 51 would be among the provisions to which no reservations could be made. 37 Even though the Conference deleted all provisions relating to the possibility of making reservations, in its
Commentary the ICRC specified that reservations to this article, even partial ones, could jeopardise the balance achieved with difficulty between the divergent views that emerged in the Diplomatic Conference. 38 Thus, any such reservation would be against the object and purpose of this 'indispensable provision'. 39 These findings are essential in terms of the issue of human shields, because they extend to paragraph 7.
The last remaining step in the codification of the prohibition of the use of human shields was its definition as a war crime entailing individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law. This step was at last taken in 1998 with the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The Rome Statute of 1998
The use of human shields during an international armed conflict is characterised as a war 
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There appears to be no requirement that the civilians are taken as hostages, or that they have chosen voluntarily to act as human shields. Rather, the essential element is the intention to use the presence of humans as shields to shelter a military objective from attack or to shield, favour or impede military operations. 43 The difficulties in this case arise from the assessment of the intent of the defending party which must be made on a case-by-case basis. 44 There has also been some discussion in relation to Element 1. Some delegations expressed the view that the wording 'or otherwise took advantage of the location' failed to capture both the situation where civilians are already present at a certain place and the situation where civilians voluntarily move to a place. 45 to AP I, that the word 'location' in Element 1 be changed to 'presence or movements'.
variation of location. 47 They also underlined that what is important in this crime is not the type of movement or location being used, but the intended use, as expressed in Element 2.
With that clarification, the proposed elements for this crime were accepted without change. 
Human Shields in non-international armed conflict
Before moving on to section C, it is necessary to briefly mention the rules regulating the use of human shields in non-international armed conflict ('NIAC'). As stated in the introduction, the reason the current study focuses on the rules applicable in IACs is not because they are deemed to be of greater importance. On the contrary, the occurrence of international armed conflicts has substantively decreased in comparison to NIACs. Furthermore, a number of the examples mentioned in sections A and C have taken place in the context of a NIAC. Hence, the focus on the norms of international armed conflict can be explained by the fact that all relevant provisions contained in the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions and AP I pertaining to human shields are considered to reflect customary IHL.
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The problem concerning the use of human shields in NIACs used to be the lack of an express prohibition in Additional Protocol II ('AP II'). It excluded paragraph 5 from the final version of the article. However, the exclusion cannot undermine the importance of the provision relating to human shields. This is evident from the statement made by the Norwegian delegation whereby the rejection of the most important parts of Article 26 were 'serious blows to the humanitarian cause'. 52 It further added that the intrinsic value of Protocol II was to be found in the provisions for protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and that the adoption of some parts of Article 26 nevertheless represented some very modest progress. proposed inclusion of the provision concerning the use of human shields in the final version of AddiAP II, practice has developed to adapt the rules on the use of human shields in international armed conflict to those regulating NIACs. 58 Consequently, it can be deduced that the general legal norms governing the use of human shields are applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. This conclusion is also supported by the ICRC which has explicitly reminded parties to both international and non-international armed conflicts that the prohibition of using human shields extends to both types of conflict.
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However, some discrepancies do occur and the most notable exception concerns the possibility that this crime be prosecuted before the ICC under the Rome Statute. The prohibition discussed in section B.4 pertains only to crimes committed during an international armed conflict.
Having outlined the legal framework governing the use of human shields in both international and non-international armed conflicts, the analysis can now move on to the next section where the conclusions so far will be opposed to the principles of IHL which the attacking party must observe. This will be illustrated with examples from both types of conflict.
C. LEGALITY OF ATTACKS UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF IHL
In this section, the relevant principles of IHL are applied in answering the main question as to what constitutes a legitimate attack against human shields. Three steps will be undertaken in achieving this task. First, the status of human shields under international law in relation to the principle of distinction will be examined. In particular, the issue of whether human shields directly take part in hostilities will be analysed. Second, taking into consideration the legal status of human shields, the question whether human shields should be excluded from the proportionality assessment will be addressed. Finally, the matter whether the issuing of an advance warning by the attacking party affects its obligations vis-à-vis the civilians forming the human shield will be discussed.
Direct participation in hostilities
Generally speaking, civilians are persons who are not members of armed forces or militias.
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Their protection under IHL is not unlimited as they waive their civilian protection when they 65 it is claimed that the Guidance adopted a neutral, impartial, and balanced approach, resisting proposals coming from both extremes, whilst ensuring that the final interpretation would still be commensurate with the foundational principles of IHL.
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Furthermore, the three conditions do not seem to be disputed. In his critique on the constitutive elements in the ICRC Guidance on DPH, Schmitt agrees with all three constitutive elements in principle, noting only that the Guidance defines them too restrictively. 67 Therefore, given the fact that the constitutive elements are seemingly not disputed in their essence, they can be used as basic guidelines in the present analysis. In applying these elements, the analysis will take into account -but will not be limited to -the ICRC's interpretation.
a) Involuntary human shields and direct participation in hostilities
It is hardly conceivable that a person, who is held and positioned in front of a military objective against his will, can be considered as taking DPH. If they are doing so because they were forced to do so by terrorists, those innocent civilians are not to be seen as taking a direct part in the hostilities. … However, if they do so of their own free will, out of support for the terrorist organization, they should be seen as persons taking a direct part in the hostilities. As a result, according to the US DoD Manual, human shields should be excluded from the proportionality assessment. 98 However, this conclusion seems inaccurate as the following two sections will demonstrate.
a) Involuntary human shields in the proportionality assessment
Scholars such as Rubinstein and Roznai have distinguished between involuntary and
unknowing human shields, arguing that the proportionality assessment must be adapted to the circumstances. 99 This distinction is made in relation to the taking of precautionary measures (see section C.3). An advance warning would make the unknowing civilians aware that they are situated near a military target and enable them to find shelter. When involuntary human shields protect the military objective, the warning is intended to inform the party using the human shields that their objective is about to be targeted in spite of the use of civilian presence. 100 Finally, these authors affirm that in both cases the shields retain their civilian protection and the present author supports this conclusion.
However, Rubinstein and Roznai go even further, asserting that when the use of involuntary or unknowing human shields is part of a widespread or systematic policy, the measure of proportionality must be adjusted. 101 They argue that when civilians are placed as shields next to a military objective, the proportionality assessment cannot be detached from the shielding party's actions and ought to take into account the incentive to illegally use Again, this approach seems flawed. As for the first argument put forward, although exceptions exist, the majority of military manuals provide for respect for the principle of nonreciprocity. 108 Furthermore, in its study on customary IHL, the ICRC presented abundant evidence to conclude that this principle reflects customary IHL. 109 As for the second argument, one might argue that the bombings over Beirut do not represent contemporary IHL pertaining to the use of and attacks against human shields. For instance, during the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, the Allied forces were reluctant to make such bold statements despite the use of human shields by the Serbs. On the contrary, the 2000 NATO Secretary-General's report affirmed that the selection of targets was carefully reviewed at multiple levels of command in order to ensure compliance with international law. 110 In addition, the report stated that the concern to avoid unintentional damage was a principal constraining factor and many targets were not attacked because the risk to non-combatants was considered too high despite the reported use of human shields by the Serbs. 111 It can be deduced from these statements that the use of human shields did not alter the proportionality assessment. Even if on some occasions these statements do not reflect reality, 112 the fact that NATO officials conceded that attacks against human shields cause excessive damage (as that over Beirut) ensures that it is perceived that human shields should not presuppose a looser assessment.
It is thus contended that proportionality assessment should remain strict and in no way are involuntary human shields to be excluded from the equation.
b) Voluntary human shields in the proportionality assessment
In the analysis so far, it was determined that generally voluntary human shields, like involuntary ones, do not engage in DPH (see section C.1(b)). Nevertheless, the next question that arises is whether the same proportionality assessment criteria are applicable to voluntary human shields.
Indeed this is the case in most scenarios. Logically, the proponents of the notion that voluntary human shields are DPH support the view that 'it would be incongruent to suggest they should nevertheless count in proportionality calculations'. 113 The main argument in support of the view that voluntary human shields should be excluded from the proportionality assessment is that should they be excluded, they would be unable to achieve their goals and thus lose their incentive to expose themselves to risk because they would not alter the obligations of the attacking party nor pose any legal obstacles in carrying out the attacks.
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However, given the fact that under the current legal framework there is no provision explicitly addressing the issue of voluntary human shields, it appears they remain covered by the general legal framework pertaining to human shields. 115 Hence, the protection normally afforded to involuntary human shields would apply to voluntary ones. As a result, voluntary human shields must not be excluded from the proportionality assessment.
Practice also seems to support this view. During the 1999 Yugoslavian war, there were occasions when hundreds of civilians flocked onto the bridges in Belgrade in order to shield them from NATO airstrikes. 116 In relation to these events, the NATO commander was adamant that 'no responsible commander wishes to kill civilians … Every day we did our very, very best to limit collateral damage and limit the loss of life on the adversary's side'.
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If commanders perceived voluntary shields as DPH and not to be included in the proportionality assessment, they would not have been considered as possible collateral damage.
Nevertheless, another factor needs to be taken into consideration, known as 'the inherent risk run by voluntary human shields'. 118 Although voluntary human shields do not lose civilian protection under IHL, they are at greater risk of being targeted by virtue of their proximity to a military target. 119 Hence an analogy may be drawn between voluntary human shields and workers in armament or munitions factories. 120 In both cases, the individuals continue to benefit from their civilian protection, but as long as the attacking party can prove that the military necessity to attack the military objective was in proportion to the civilian losses incurred, the operation would be lawful in spite of the greater number of casualties expected.
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The main concern in this regard is the definition of "excessive". The workers in armament or munitions factories, as well as the voluntary human shields, run the 'inherent risk'. Nonetheless, the former (similarly to involuntary human shields) lack the volitional element to shield. On the other hand, voluntary human shields are fully aware that they are shielding a military objective and have the intention to do so. 122 During the drafting of the ICRC Guide on DPH one of the experts shared a similar view opining that the question of proportionality was better phrased as the question of "excessive" civilian casualties. In determining how many casualties would be excessive, one always had to take into account the concrete situation and context. somewhat looser proportionality test should be acceptable on the occasion that the civilians voluntarily expose themselves to military attacks. This, however, is not meant to support Dinstein's notion that attacks against military objectives may proceed as if the voluntary human shield were not there. 123 It is argued that proportionality must generally remain applicable although more civilian damage is to be accepted when determining the threshold for an "excessive" attack. Inevitably, particularly when voluntary human shields are involved, proportionality calculations would depend on a unique set of circumstances.
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Consequently, the bridges in Belgrade could have been legitimately targeted with a bigger number of casualties anticipated in comparison to a hypothetical situation in which they were held there against their will. It should be noted that children must not be considered voluntary human shields under any circumstances as they cannot be considered as having a will of their own. 125 Moreover, a looser assessment must be applied only in exceptional circumstances given the blurred lines between voluntary and involuntary human shields. Only when there is sufficient evidence that civilians are shielding a military target on their own free will should the shields be considered voluntary (see section C.2(c)). Therefore, in most cases the stricter, regular proportionality assessment would apply.
The observations so far can be concluded by reiterating that the principle of conclusions from sections C.2(a) and C.2(b), these actions could also alter the proportionality assessment.
Vice versa, what if civilians appear to shield a military target voluntarily, whilst in reality they are coerced to do so? Then the coercing party would not lose credibility while the civilians risk their lives to an even bigger extent than if they were undoubtedly held against their will. Thus, when no reliable information proving a specific volitional element to shield is available, the presumption must be that those civilians act involuntarily. 132 It is problematic that such an act cannot fall under perfidy as defined in the Hague Regulations 133 and AP I. 134 The prohibition enshrined in these instruments only concerns the killing, injuring or capturing of an adversary by resort to perfidy. 135 In the present case the adversary suffers no such harm. As a result, the attacking party could be misled without any legal consequences. Depending on the circumstances, this could further hamper the attacking party's military operations. Additionally, it might lead to more casualties.
In sum, given the findings that a difference concerning the legality of attacks against voluntary and involuntary human shields does exist, it can be concluded that the legal framework pertaining to perfidy should be expanded to include acts as exemplified in this section.
Advance warnings
The principle of precautions in attack is the final relevant principle regarding the lawfulness of attacks. In order to comply with this principle, when a choice between several military objectives for obtaining similar military advantage is possible, the attacking party must select the objective which is not shielded by civilians. 136 danger, it should take into account how they expect the civilian population to carry out the instructions. 138 It also noted the importance of the warning being timely, giving the civilians sufficient time to evacuate and ensuring they are not attacked while evacuating. 139 Thus it seems difficult to determine the specificity of an advance warning, reconciling the protection of the civilian population with the gaining of military advantage. 140 The proposed adequacy of an advance warning depends on whether it reaches those who are exposed to danger, whether it is clear and credible, and specific enough regarding the location to be affected. 141 Moreover, the requirement that the warning be timely should also imply that it must not be made too early as then the upcoming attack could be conceived as false.
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Given that an advance warning is made, what are the consequences for the human shields if they remain in the vicinity of the military objective after the warning was issued?
Some commentators argue that in the case of voluntary human shields, a refusal to abandon the shielded object constitutes DPH. 143 Furthermore, Israeli practice in Lebanon shows Israeli officials believed that everyone who remained behind after the dropping of the leaflets that served as advance warnings was linked to Hezbollah, and therefore a legitimate target of attack. 144 The leaflets also alerted that any pickup truck or truck travelling south of the Litani River will be suspected of transporting rockets and weapons and may be bombed. 145 The present author firmly disagrees with these approaches. Firstly, the taking of precautionary measures should not be confused with the principle of distinction. Therefore, if voluntary human shields do not fulfil the criteria for DPH as described above, they would still not be participating directly even if an advance warning is issued. If civilians retain their civilian protection while shielding a military target, the warning itself does not deprive them of this protection. A proportionality assessment should be made before carrying out the attack. Hence, an advance warning merely informs the voluntary shields that a potential attack against them has been considered proportionate. It is up to them to decide whether they would remain in the area to be attacked under these circumstances. It is part of the inherent risk they face when engaging in shielding military targets. As for the second approach taken in the conflict in Lebanon, it totally disregards the principle of distinction. In addition, it is widely open for abuse. For instance, Israel stated that during the bombings in 2006 the advance warnings made were large-scale, exceeding the demands of international law in their attempts to keep the number of fatalities among the population to a bare minimum. 146 In reality, many people were unable to leave either because they were part of a vulnerable group, had no means of transportation or simply because the destruction of infrastructure made it impossible. 147 Many of those who left were attacked on their way out. 148 Therefore, the assumption that an advance warning could give the attacking party carte blanche to attack indiscriminately an entire area without taking into consideration the possibilities for the civilians used as shields to benefit from the warning is inadmissible. Even if the warnings were effective, there is no legal basis in IHL whereby an advance warning precludes respect for the principles of IHL. Article 57(5) of AP I explicitly states that no provision in Article 57
(including advance warnings) may be construed as authorising any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects. Although in the example given Israel is not a party to AP I, 149 the ICRC maintains that all obligations with respect to the principle of distinction and the conduct of hostilities remain applicable even if civilians remain in the zone of operations after a warning has been issued. 150 Thus, neither voluntary nor involuntary/unknowing human shields can be excluded from the proportionality assessment on the basis that they have remained in the vicinity of a military objective after an advance warning was given.
A more problematic issue arises in relation to the obligations of the attacking party compared to those of the defending party when it comes to precautionary measures. It is argued that the prohibition of the use of human shields and the obligation to remove the civilian population from the vicinity of military objectives 151 provide for dissimilar standards. 152 While the violation of the former requires a specific intent to shield, the violation of the latter is not that strict ('endeavour to remove'). As a result, the obligations for the defending party seem to resemble recommendations rather than strict obligations. 153 This disparity in the legal weight of the provisions has been reflected in the criticism against the Goldstone report. 154 In fact, the Report only concludes that Palestinians were not forced to act as human shields and fails to mention the obligation to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives. 155 Nevertheless, when discussing the legality of attacks against human shields, the principle of non-reciprocity should be taken into account (see section C.2(a)).
Although it can be agreed that a disparity does exist, the law, as it stands, allows the carrying out of attacks in light of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, regardless of whether the enemy abides by those principles. Therefore, although some intermingling of civilians and combatants is virtually inevitable, 156 this does not release the attacking party from its own obligations.
In sum, the issuing of an advance warning does not preclude parties from applying the principles of distinction and proportionality as demonstrated in the Lebanon example. As for the disparity between the obligations of the attacking and the defending party, the principle of non-reciprocity remains applicable. Hence the criticism towards the Goldstone report relating to that point is more of a political nature than of a legal one.
D. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, attacks against human shields can be lawful, but only if they are in compliance with the basic principles of IHL. The principles of non-reciprocity, distinction, proportionality and precaution were examined as the main pillars of IHL which contain the legal framework pertaining to human shields. In applying those principles to the phenomenon of human shields, an attempt was made to give guidance on the legality of attacks against human shields under the current IHL framework. Firstly, it was ascertained that human shields in general continue to enjoy civilian protection. leads to physical harm to the attacker, but could also impose stricter legal obligations.
Finally, more pressure should be put on defending parties to act under Article 58 of AP I in order to prevent to the biggest extent possible difficult choices before the attacking parties.
The obligations of the defending party to prevent human shielding should be put on equal terms as those of the attacking party not to attack them indiscriminately.
Yet the present author merely presented the legality of attacks against human shields in an ideal manner where IHL is applied in good faith. In practice, IHL violations occur in almost any armed conflict. Furthermore, even if the potential attack is legal, would the attacking party overcome the moral and political constraints in launching it? In the case of human shields, the attacking party does not estimate the approximate collateral damage which might occur, but it directly aims at and intentionally targets an objective where the casualties are almost certain to result. 159 The current discussion did not include the moral side of the issue. It is up to military commanders to decide whether the moral and political considerations outweigh the legal and military ones. Still, civilians remain civilians regardless of whether they are utilized by the defending party to deter attacks or not.
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